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Abstract 
Financial incentives in primary care have been often introduced with the purpose of improving 
appropriateness of care and containing demand. We usually observe pay-for-performance programs, 
but alternatives have been also implemented, such as pay-for-participation in improvement 
activities and pay-for-compliance with clinical guidelines. Here, we assess the influence of different 
programs which ensure extra-payments to GPs, for containing episodes of avoidable 
hospitalisations. Our dataset covers patients and GPs of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna for year 
2005, and we control for a wide range of factors potentially influencing GPs’ behaviour. By 
separating pay-for-performance from pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs, we 
estimate the impact on the probability of (inappropriate) hospitalisation of financial incentives 
included in contracts between GPs and the NHS. As dependent variable, we consider two different 
sets of conditions, for both of which timely and effective primary care should be able to limit the 
need of hospital admission. The first is based on 27 medical DRGs that Emilia-Romagna identifies 
as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care, while the second refers to the internationally 
recognised ACSCs (ambulatory care-sensitive conditions). We show that pay-for-performance 
schemes may have a significant effect over aggregate indicators of appropriateness, while the 
effectiveness of pay-for-participation schemes is adequately captured only by taking into account 
subpopulations affected by specific diseases. Moreover, the same incentive scheme has fairly 
different effects on the two sets of indicators used, with performance improvements limited to the 
target explicitly addressed by the policy maker (i.e. the list of 27 DRGs). This evidence is consistent 
with the idea that a “tunnel vision” effect may occur when public authorities promote and monitor 
specific sets of objectives, as proxies for more general improvements in health care practices. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the efforts for cost containment in healthcare have increased the need to identify 
where resources can be most efficiently targeted and also primary care has received increasing 
attention. In order to promote higher quality of care, programs have been introduced worldwide to 
ensure extra financial rewards to GPs involved in care improvement activities. Such schemes 
frequently adopt a pay-for-performance structure, where payments are contingent on meeting 
indicators of provider effort. Alternatively, other strategies have been developed, each with its 
distinctive strengths and weaknesses, with physicians rewarded for participation in improvement 
activities and/or for compliance with clinical guidelines.  
For instance, the Quality and Outcomes Framework signed in 2003 in the UK is a mix of pay-for-
performance and pay-for-compliance schemes that makes a substantial part of GP's income (about 
30%) contingent on attaining 146 quality indicators, covering clinical care for 10 chronic disease, 
organisation of care and patient experience. In the US, public and private payers have made 
available financial incentives (in the range of 1 to 10% of total revenues) to hospitals and other 
health care providers as well as to individual physicians participating in collecting information 
and/or meeting quality targets. In Italy, the experience of financial incentives is limited to primary 
care, but it refers to a small part of GP's total revenue.  
Our study focuses on medical conditions where timely and effective provision of primary care 
should reduce the risk of hospitalization and examines the influence on (potentially inappropriate) 
hospitalisations of different sets of programs providing economic incentives to GPs for improving 
appropriateness of care. More precisely, we analyse the impact of the use of economic incentives by 
Regional and Local Health Authorities (LHAs) in contracts for primary care in the Italian region 
Emilia-Romagna for the year 2005, distinguishing pay-for-performance from pay-for-participation 
and pay-for-compliance programs. We test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients cared by 
GPs that receive higher shares of their revenues by incentive based programs are less likely to 
experience “avoidable” hospitalisations.  
 
The paper adopts a general perspective in terms of study population and programs considered. By 
taking as reference the whole adult population and the full set of programs that provide financial 
incentives, we move away from the disease based approach adopted in previous works (Lippi Bruni, 
Nobilio & Ugolini 2009), although this comes at the cost of merging together programs pertaining 
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to different areas. Through a comprehensive analysis, our aim is to evaluate the impact of this 
policy innovation, getting rid of the limitations implied by considering each program separately. For 
instance, a more narrow approach that focuses only on specific diseases, may fail to capture 
dysfunctional consequences such as the adoption of a “tunnel vision” attitude on part of GPs, as a 
response to performance monitoring, that induce a concentration of effort only on the areas included 
in the performance indicator scheme.  
Taking up a broad viewpoint is particularly important as long as the implications of a widespread 
use of economic incentives in the Italian primary care system are potentially twofold. Not only, they 
are expected to improve results for the targets explicitly addressed, such as containing 
pharmaceutical prescriptions or reducing hospitalisation rates for specific diseases. They are also 
intended as tools for improving quality of care more generally by enforcing cooperation and 
inducing GPs, who are independent professionals contracted with the NHS, to take decisions in line 
with the general interest. In other words, providing extra money for clearly identified targets should 
(hopefully) improve quality of performances also on dimensions other than those strictly included 
in the contractual agreements, as a consequence of a more cooperative attitude of GPs. 
Given these premises, we consider two indicators for avoidable admissions. The first measure refers 
to clinical conditions for which the Regional government has explicitly sought to promote an active 
participation of GPs in improving appropriateness, whereas the second indicator is an 
internationally accepted measure of avoidable hospitalisations. The first indicator of potentially 
inappropriate hospitalisations relates to policy targets explicitly addressed by healthcare authorities. 
It corresponds to a list of 27 medical DRGs selected by the Emilia-Romagna Region as at risk of 
inappropriateness in primary care. The second indicator is based on the Ambulatory Care Sensitive 
conditions (ACSCs) developed by Billings et al. (1993). Admissions for ACSCs are “avoidable” in 
the sense that they refer to conditions (chronic conditions such as diabetes and asthma, acute 
conditions such as ear/nose/throat infections, and preventable illnesses such as tetanus) that, if 
treated properly on an outpatient basis, should not require inpatient admission. Sometimes these 
admissions may be needed (ex-post), following a decline in patient’s health, but effective and 
timely ambulatory care should be able (ex-ante) to prevent such deterioration. Therefore, 
hospitalisations of this kind are used in the literature to identify possible deficiencies in the quality 
of primary care services.  
To summarise, thanks to the inclusion of different incentive schemes as explanatory variables we 
obtain information on the extent to which the incentive structure influences the performances. 
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Moreover, by considering different dependent variables, we get insights also on the scope of such 
impact. In particular, the first measure employed here (27 DRGs) aims at capturing the 
effectiveness of the programs on targets that have explicitly attracted the policymakers’ attention, 
while ACSCs can be taken as proxy for the gains in quality – interpreted in a very broad sense - 
favoured by enhanced cooperation between GPs and the other players of the system. Indeed, this 
latter measure displays several favourable features for this purpose. It is internationally validated as 
an indicator of good quality of primary care but it is not endorsed as policy target in the present 
institutional context. Moreover, it is defined according to very different criteria with respect to our 
first indicator (ICD-9-CM codes rather than DRGs), thus allowing for sufficient differentiation 
between the two variables,  
The available dataset covers patients and GPs of the whole region and provides detailed information 
on health consumption of the population and on the different components of GP remunerations. In 
order to account for the hierarchical structure of the dataset where patients can grouped within GPs 
and GPs within districts, our empirical strategy is based on multilevel modelling (Goldstein, 2003). 
 
2. The role of incentives and motivation in health care 
Our work contributes to the literature that studies how economic incentives can be used to improve 
the governance of institutions and organisations. Given the wide set of issues at stake and the 
extremely diversified situations that fall under such framework, both the theoretical and empirical 
literature provide mixed indications. Agency theory assumes that strong monitoring by the principal 
should motivate the agent to increase effort in order to reduce his penalty if caught shirking 
(Prendergast, 1999; Laffont & Martimort, 2002). Contrariwise, following the “crowding out” theory 
(Frey & Jegen, 2001), intensive monitoring could be considered as a signal of lack of trust and 
diminish effort by reducing pre-existing intrinsic motivations. The same result could hold in case of 
rewards. The premise of pay-to-perform schemes is to increase agents’ marginal benefit of effort 
towards work outcomes relative to opportunity costs, but, introducing monetary rewards to 
compensate performance on a task that has been previously undertaken without any immediate 
monetary remuneration can actually reduce performance. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) argue that 
this may be related to the size of the monetary incentive, with crowding out most likely to occur 
with modest payments. On the contrary, external interventions could also crowd “in” intrinsic 
motivation when there is a high degree of perceived autonomy, discretion and freedom in work 
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activity, personal relationships predominate and employees participate in decision making. In this 
context, the principal could signal his confidence in the agent’s ability and strengthen the agent’s 
intrinsic motivation in the long period. 
Empirical studies of performance pay reforms in the private sector show that firms experience 
significant increases in productivity when switching from flat salary scheme to a pay for output 
scheme, where firms occasionally suffer decreases in quality when quality is not easily contractible 
(Lazear, 1996). Studies of performance pay reforms in the public sector are mostly focused on 
sporadic intervention programs and show mixed results (Heckman, Heinrich & Smith, 1996; Lavy, 
2004). Skeptics of high-powered incentives in public organizations argue that using pay-for-
performance schemes in the public sector could produce unintended consequences on workers’ 
behaviour and induce extensive gaming by public employees that may lower their productivity 
(Dixit, 2000; Smith, 1995).  
Examining the principal/agent relationship between purchaser and provider in healthcare, Goddard 
et al. (2000) stress the risks associated to the design of compensation mechanisms related to 
performance. The incompleteness of many measures may lead to the so called “tunnel vision”, e.g. 
the concentration on areas included in the performance indicator scheme to the exclusion of other 
unmeasured areas, but also to some sort of “myopia” when the effort is concentrated on short-term 
issues, excluding long-term activities which may influence performance measures only in many 
years time. Besides, when outcomes depend on the joint effort of a number of agencies, it is very 
difficult to design adequate incentive schemes able to encourage cooperation and it becomes 
possible that only local, relatively narrow, objectives are pursued at the expense of the general 
organization’s objectives. This could be relevant also if it is in the power of the agent to manipulate 
the reported data, giving rise to “mis-representation” of reported performance. Finally, when multi-
period systems of targets and rewards are used, there is a danger of creating a “ratchet effect” when 
the good performance in one year is punished with higher future targets and the agent has a strong 
incentive to report persistently mediocre level of performance. 
In healthcare pay-to-perform schemes have been increasingly adopted internationally. The focus of 
these initiatives ranges from primary to hospitals care to regional health care systems, and we 
observe a variety of methods to design the incentives and to assess their effects on quality. For the 
1999 Australian pay-for-performance scheme for GP remuneration in chronic disease management , 
Scott et al. (2008) find a positive moderate effect on quality of diabetes care. In the US, Cutler 
(2006) reports that the empirical evidence to date is “more positive than negative”, in the sense that 
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payment incentives result to produce some positive impact on the quality of care, but the effects are 
not all in the same direction. In the English pay-for-performance program, there is evidence of an 
increase in the quality of care during the first years, but also evidence of gaming and tunnel vision 
effect (Doran et al. 2006).  
To overcome the unintended side effects, health economists suggest some broad strategies 
(Mannion et al, 2007; Godager, Iversen & Ma, 2009). The first strategy concerns the enhancement 
of the information set on which both principal and agent take their decisions, in order to reduce the 
scope for misdirected efforts, and the development of performance benchmarks which are 
independent of past activity. Another strategy has to do with the degree of dissonance between the 
objectives of principal and agent (Smith, 2002). In this case the idea is to create a “culture change”, 
that is to foster a closer alignment between their objective, promoting a favourable cultural 
environment and encouraging clinical professionals themselves to promote a common culture that 
might contribute to ameliorate the agency problem. Following this strategy, payers are exploring 
alternative solutions for improving quality such as pay-for-participation programs or pay-for-
compliance programs. Both solutions generate a looser incentive structure with respect to pay-for-
performance, since payments are conditional not on the accomplishment of precise, measurable 
targets, but on personal involvement of GPs in programs aimed at improving the quality of care for 
specific diseases and/or on the adherence to clinical protocols. The (still very limited) empirical 
literature on the topic, mainly based on surgical care, outlines that there are cases in which this kind 
of incentives may prove more effective in improving the quality of care (Birkmeier & Birkmeier, 
2006). One of the potential advantages is physicians’ greater acceptance of this approach, together 
with significant improvements in providers’ adherence to evidence-based best practices. 
Nevertheless, incentive schemes that do not condition payments to the achievement of pre-defined 
individual targets may strongly attenuate the influence on physicians behaviour.  
 
3. Primary care organisation and strategies for appropriateness  
In the last fifteen years, significant changes introduced in the Italian NHS have widened regional 
powers in the organisation and provision of healthcare. Such process has gone together with an 
increase in direct financial responsibilities of regional governments according to the principles of 
fiscal federalism. As for primary care, a series of reforms implemented in the 90’s have enhanced 
the integration between district and primary care services and reinforced group practice. Moreover, 
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they have set the basis for introducing additional financial rewards to GPs for meeting specific 
policy goals (France, Taroni & Donatini, 2005).  
The responsibility for organising primary care, and more generally non-hospital services, is 
attributed to health districts grouped into LHAs. The relationship between the NHS and GPs, who 
are independent professionals acting as gatekeeper to secondary care, is regulated through 
contractual agreements, which set, among other things, the remuneration profile. Capitation is the 
primary source of GPs’ remuneration and money follows patients’ decision to enrol with a 
particular GP. In recent years, a maximum limit of 1500 patients has been introduced and GPs 
already exceeding such threshold can keep their additional patients but they cannot add new ones. 
In addition to that, GPs receive also fee-for-service compensations for providing specific treatments 
such as minor surgery, preventive activities and post surgery follow-ups. Both the fixed (capitation) 
and the variable (fee-for service) components are negotiated between the GPs’ trade unions and the 
central government and are uniform nationwide.  
On top of them, each region can introduce a third component of the remuneration, typically aimed 
at promoting appropriateness of care and cost containment. Indeed, consistently with the policy 
guidelines and the institutional framework designed by each region, LHAs and health districts can 
autonomously negotiate with the local organisations of GPs additional payments for specific 
programs, that address priority targets identified at the regional and local level. 
In Emilia-Romagna, the regional government has devoted substantial effort to enhance an 
appropriate use of hospital services. Using DRGs and Disease Staging, a classification was 
developed to identify cases of potentially inappropriate hospitalisations. To assist LHA managers in 
identifying the appropriate level of alternative, low intensity, treatment settings for patients who do 
not need acute care hospitalization, the Regional Health Authority has produced in 2004 an “Atlas 
of appropriateness of hospital use”. As for primary care, since 2001 the LHAs have been involving 
GPs in policies aimed at substituting hospital with community-based care, for conditions typically 
associated to chronic pathologies such as diabetes, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
congestive heart failure, hypertension and psychiatric disorders. Regional guidelines have been 
issued for encouraging cooperation between primary and secondary care providers, and the 
implementation of these measures was pursued through the introduction of several programs based on 
financial incentives at the district level.  
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Pay-for-performance programs are characterised by a strict link between financial transfer and 
targets achievement to be verified ex-post. In Emilia Romagna, they are negotiated between district 
or LHA and GPs trade unions. Examples are the financial rewards to GPs that meet targets for the 
prescription rate of generic relatively to non-generic drugs or extra-payments for GPs that keep 
hospitalization rates below predefined thresholds for a series of listed conditions. Usually, the 
financial rewards adjusts to the performance level, according to a graduated scale that begins at the 
attainment of a minimum threshold and increases up to a maximum level. As for primary care, GPs 
receive financial incentives to deliver high quality services that improve clinical and organizational 
appropriateness. The main target indicators refer to pathologies for which GPs have the stronger 
potential of influencing the rate of inappropriateness in the setting of care. For example, some local 
contracts provide financial incentives to contain the standardized ordinary hospitalization rate, to 
decrease the emergency admissions rate, to increase the number of protected hospital discharges for 
patients needing follow-up care or treatment after a hospital stay, to reduce hospitalization for 
elderly patients strengthening the capacity of the home and community care system.  
Pay-for-participation schemes are an heterogeneous group of programs aimed at encouraging 
physician’s participation in the management of specific conditions (e.g. diabetes, hypertension, 
oncology, asthma and dementia) which require additional efforts directly devoted to each diagnosed 
patient. These payments can be labelled “pay-for-participation” because the financial bonus does 
not depend on the achievement of specific targets as for pay-for performance. For instance, various 
districts – though not all - have developed programs that require physicians to take part in local 
diabetes management plans through which GPs are entitled to a financial bonus for the assumption 
of responsibility of each diabetic patient. GPs in charge of providing care to individuals expected to 
require higher than average effort - as diabetes type II patients - receive an extra payment that 
supplements standard capitation. A key feature of “pay-for-participation” is that  the amount 
received by GPs is defined on a per-patient basis and, therefore, depends on the number of patients 
with the diagnosed disease falling  under his responsibility and not on some measure of 
performance as it would be for the reduction in avoidable hospitalisations.  
Finally, pay-for-compliance schemes introduce financial transfers to GPs who take part in various 
activities that promote cooperation with professionals dealing with other levels of care. Additional 
compensations are provided for attending audit meetings, for actively participating in the 
development of new protocols and guidelines or for implementing evidence-based best practices, 
such as increasing influenza immunisation uptake for the elderly and uptake of breast and cervical 
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cancer screenings or to increase the local rate of domiciliary care. In this case, differently from pay-
for-participation, GPs’ compensation is not related to the number of patients included in the list of 
the GP, but to the number of activities the physician is involved in.  
 
4. Data and estimation issues  
Our dataset covers year 2005 and encompasses the regional population aged between 18-74 
(2.936.384 individuals), the 3.229 GPs operating in the region and the 39 healthcare districts 
belonging to 11 LHAs.  
We consider two dependent variables, both identified through hospital discharge data. The first 
indicator is based on the list of 27 medical DRGs at risk of inappropriateness in primary care 
identified by the Region (Model A) and listed in the Regional resolution 319/2000 (Table 1). The 
total number of inappropriate admissions identified according to this criterion amounts to 11.552 
(0,4% of the study population). In the second case, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the 
patient has been hospitalised for an episode classified as ACSCs (Model B) and 0 otherwise. We 
adopt here the list of ACSCs coded using the International classification of diseases (ICD-9-CM) 
and developed by Billings et al. (1993) and Caminal et al. (2004). We classify hospitalisations as 
inappropriate if at least one of the ICD-9-CM codes included in the ACSCs’ list is recorded as the 
primary reason for admission (see Table 2). The total number of ACSCs admissions recorded in the 
dataset amounts to 16.924, which corresponds to the 0,58% of the study population .  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 
 
Table 3 presents a cross tabulation of DRGs and ACSCs. Although both indicators proxy poor 
quality of primary care, the different criteria according to which they are defined lead to a limited 
overlap of events. In particular, only one third of the cases identified as 1 according to the DRG 
criterion are the same also under the ACSCs criterion (3918 out of 11552) and less than one fourth 
of the events classified as  ACSCs are associated to one of the 27 DRGs (3918 out of 16924). 
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INSERT TABLE 3 
We record detailed information at the patient, GP and district level (Table 4). Patient characteristics 
include gender, age and the presence of comorbidities that are summarised in the Charlson index 
(Charlson et al., 1987; Romano et al., 1993). The Charlson index is a weighted index of patient 
comorbidity, computed from the ICD-9-CM diagnostic and procedure codes available in 
administrative datasets according to their potential for influencing mortality. As regards GPs, we 
control for GP gender, age, practice location in urban areas and for type of practice, distinguishing 
single-handed from group practices. We include also information on list size and on the average age 
of the patients included. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
We aggregate the financial incentives received by GPs as variable part of their remuneration in 
three groups: pay-for-performance, pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance. In order to get rid 
of scale effects due to list size, these variables are measured as share of GPs annual income. Table 5 
summarises the size of the three groups of incentives across LHAs, while Figure 1 displays  their 
distribution among the 39 regional districts. The share of total income received through the three 
schemes varies considerably among GPs. This is due, in the first place, to the variability in the 
financial size of the programs recorded across districts.  
INSERT TABLE 5 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
As regards the district level, we investigate the influence of local conditions by including controls 
for supply side characteristics such as hospital beds and district hospitalization rates.  
Patients are clustered according to the GP they are enrolled with and, in turn, GPs are clustered 
according to the district they work in. Grouping of observations may determine the presence of 
(unobserved) common factors among the units that belong to the same group. Having to deal with 
data characterised by such a hierarchical structure, our empirical strategy is based on multilevel 
modelling (Iversen & Luras, 2000). This estimation technique has the advantage of allowing the 
Var/Cov matrix of the error terms to account for possible correlation of observations belonging to 
the same layer. In this way, a correction is introduced in the size of the standard errors and 
appropriate confidence intervals can be computed (Guo & Zhao, 2000).  
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In our estimates three layers are identified: the patient (i), the GP (j) and the district (k). Given the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we estimate the following three-level logit model: 
 
(1) 
 
where ijkpi corresponds to ( )jkkijkijk uXy 00 ,,1Pr ν=  and ijky  is the realisation of a random variable 
ijkY  assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution with parameter πijk. Here, πijk represents the 
probability that a patient i falling under the responsibility of GP j in district k is hospitalised for an 
episode that is  classified as avoidable admission. We estimate model (1) regressing two alternative 
dichotomous indicators, expressed by a list of DRGs at risk of inappropriateness and ACSCs, 
against the same set of explanatory variables. The random component of the estimated equation 
comprises three distinct parts, that represent the random errors for the patient (εijk), GP (u0jk ) and 
district (v0k ) level respectively. Our distributional assumptions consider random components at 
different levels to be uncorrelated and normally distributed, while we permit observations referring 
to patients cared by the same physician or in the same district to be correlated (Rasbash et al, 2000). 
We compute also the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) ρh as estimates of the share of the 
total variance that potentially refers to each layer h (Browne et al., 2005).  
 variancetotal
units-macrobetween   variancepopulation
== ICCρ    (2) 
For each dependent variable, we estimate a three-level logit model where GPs are nested within 
districts. Estimations are carried out with the SAS GLIMMIX procedure (SAS Institute, 2005), 
using the IGLS algorithm with a pseudo-likelihood procedure. We take deviance as measure of 
goodness of fit, and significance of the coefficients is assessed through the Wald statistic 
(Goldstein, 2003).  
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 6 presents estimates of equation (1) for the two dependent variables (Model A- DRGs and 
Model B- ACSCs). In both cases we consider a three level logit model.  
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INSERT TABLE 6 
For both models, the estimated variances of the districts are significant and confirm the existence of 
substantial residual variability across local areas, which cannot be fully captured by controls for 
patients, physicians and districts characteristics. Consequently, despite the wide set of available 
information, potentially relevant unobservables affecting local areas and practices are still included 
in the error component.  
Patients' characteristics, that adjust for differences in the case-mix across practices, are significant 
both in Model A and B. Interestingly, despite the use of different dependent variables not only the 
signs and significance levels, but also the coefficients are fairly comparable across specifications. In 
particular, male, older patients as well as those reporting more comorbidities, display a higher 
probability of incurring in avoidable hospitalisations. As regards physician characteristics, in both 
models the average age of the list and the urban location of the practice decrease the probability of 
hospitalisation for both dependent variables. Moreover, younger GPs and those working in single 
handed practices show a higher probability to have patients hospitalized for a DRG at risk of 
inappropriateness, while no significant difference is recorded when considering ACSCs.  
One of the main policy question addressed in the paper concerns the role of financial incentives. 
Our results suggest that different programs produce a different impact. Pay-for-participation 
programs are never significant. On the contrary, in one of the estimated models, both pay-for-
performance and pay-for-compliance, though the latter more weakly, influence the probability of 
avoidable hospitalisations. Moreover, financial transfers aimed at improving the appropriateness of 
hospital referrals through additional financial transfers to GPs are effective if we take the list of 27 
DRGs as reference, while they are not, if one considers ACSCs. That is, we find a positive 
association between financial incentives and performances in primary care only if avoidable 
hospitalisations are measured according to conditions over which the healthcare authorities have 
explicitly drawn GPs’ attention (i.e. the 27 DRGs).  
In the policymaker’s perspective two lessons can be drawn. First, the result from the DRGs model 
suggests that, when additional money is accompanied by active promotion of clearly identified 
policy objectives, such investments seem to be effective in inducing GPs to back the policymaker’s 
effort for improving quality of care. At the same time, if we measure appropriateness of primary 
care through indicators widely used at the international level - such as ACSCs - but not explicitly 
endorsed in the present institutional context, no association is recorded between the share of 
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revenues received through incentive-based programs and quality of primary care. This result can be 
interpreted as suggestive of the fact that we cannot find support for the optimistic view according to 
which provision of extra-money to GPs for specific programs improves quality of care also on 
dimensions than go beyond the targets identified by policymakers. ACSCs can be seen as good 
proxy to capture such wider perspective since they are validated by the scientific community but 
here they are not identified as reference targets by public authorities and display a limited overlap 
with the DRGs on which public authorities have focused. In conclusion, our evidence indicates that, 
not only the way the incentive schemes is designed, but also the link between the target taken as 
reference and its institutional endorsement is crucial. 
A further remark concerns pay-for-participation programs, whose coefficient is not significant in 
either model. As financial transfers for these programs represent the largest share of extra-payments 
to GPs, one could wonder why they are not as effective as the other ones. This empirical puzzle can 
be explained by keeping in mind that pay-for-participation schemes are usually associated to the 
management of specific diseases such as diabetes, asthma or hypertension. Consequently, their 
impact is likely to be loosely measured when we refer to the general population instead of focusing 
on the groups of patients targeted by each program.  
In order to test this hypothesis, we consider a specific disease: diabetes type II. To extract the sub-
population of type-2 diabetic patients we exploit identifiers previously developed for a related study 
(Lippi Bruni, Nobilio & Ugolini, 2009). Adjustments with respect to models A-B have to be made 
in order to account for disease specific features. In particular, outcomes are given by the ACSC 
codes listed in Table 2 that refer to acute complications for diabetes (comas) that should be avoided 
through an effective patient management. They are identified by hospital records in which ICD-9 
codes 250.2 to 250.3 are documented as primary or most responsible diagnosis. Table 7 presents the 
explanatory variables that to a large extent corresponds to those employed in the general model. An 
exception being the substitution of the Charlson index with insulin dependence as proxy for 
severity, to get a disease specific indicator. 
INSERT TABLE 7 
Consistently with the more focused approach adopted here, we consider only payments aimed at 
improving diabetes care, which in Emilia Romagna typically take the form of pay-for-participation 
programs. Figure 2 presents the distribution of this payment scheme among the 38 regional districts 
as a fraction of GPs annual income (one district was excluded as its hospitalisation rates for diabetic 
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comas were over 10 times the regional average, probably due to a coding mistake). Finally, to 
account for supply side characteristics, we consider at the third level the presence of hospital 
diabetes specialised wards. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
Despite using data for a different year (2003 vs. 2005) and a slightly different specification, the 
results confirm previous evidence (Lippi Bruni, Nobilio & Ugolini 2009). Patients' characteristics 
are again strong predictors of the probability of hospitalisation. As for financial incentives, we 
observe a significant association between the health outcome and the additional payments provided 
to GPs through pay-for-participation programs for diabetes care. This confirms that, given the 
design of incentives in the present institutional context, the role of pay-for-participation program 
can be better evaluated if one takes a disease-based perspective, instead of the more aggregate 
approach adopted throughout the paper.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the influence of economic incentives included in Regional and Local 
Health Authority contracts for primary care in the Italian region Emilia-Romagna (year 2005). We 
consider two different measures of avoidable admissions as dependent variable and three groups of 
programs: pay-for-performance, pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance. The first dependent 
variable is obtained from the list of 27 medical DRGs that Emilia-Romagna identifies as at risk of 
organizational inappropriateness in primary care, while the second is the rate of preventable 
hospitalisations measured by ACSCs.  
Data clustering across LHAs and GPs leads to the choice of multilevel modelling. Patients' 
characteristics emerge as the most important factors influencing the two dependent variables and all 
coefficients are fairly robust across specifications. Several physician characteristics display a 
significant impact, specially when we consider the 27 medical DRGs. In this case, younger GPs, 
those working in rural  areas and in single handed practices show a higher probability to have their 
patients hospitalized for a condition at risk of inappropriateness.  
In a policy perspective, the paper’s main aim is to evaluate the impact of financial incentives 
introduced to promote good quality of primary care and, consequently, appropriate use of hospital 
resources. Two main results emerge from the analysis. First, taking two different sets of indicators 
as dependent variables produces fairly different results. When we refer to indicators, such as the list 
of 27 DRGs identified as important policy target by the Regional Health Authority we find that, 
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other things equal, additional financial transfers reduce the probability of episodes of 
inappropriateness of care. At the opposite, moving to indicators such as ACSCs, that are 
internationally accepted, but for which no specific action has been undertaken for raising GPs 
awareness in the present institutional context, we observe no relation between the amount of 
financial incentives received by a GP and the probability of experiencing avoidable hospitalisation 
for his patients. This first result suggests that explicit institutional support is crucial for making 
quality improvement activities successful.  
A second important finding concerns the different impact produced by different types of programs. 
Our estimates show that, the larger the share of revenues provided to GPs through pay-for-
performance programs, the lower the probability of their patients to experience hospitalisation for 
the 27 DRGs at risk of inappropriateness. A similar result holds also for pay-for-compliance 
programs, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. At the opposite, pay-for-
participation programs, despite providing a relatively larger amount of money, are never significant. 
We argue that the latter result is probably due to the fact that such scheme is mostly used for 
improving the management of particular diseases. Consequently, its impact is more precisely 
evaluated by choosing disease specific outcomes as dependent variable, as we document for 
diabetes care.  
We conclude with a few cautionary remarks. First, our analysis bears the limitations implicit in the 
use of cross sectional data for the identification of strong causal relationship. Nonetheless, it must 
be reminded that incentive programs are contracted at the district level and, once an agreement is 
reached, GPs working in the district are part of it. This implies that, the largest share of variability 
in economic incentives is recorded between rather than within districts. At the same time, 
movements of physicians across districts are extremely rare. The propensity of citizens to change 
GP is limited, and mostly motivated by changes in residence. In this context, the time spam required 
to create a sufficiently large list in a new district is so long that the (opportunity) costs of moving 
becomes prohibitive. Given this, the possibility for a GP to participate in incentive based programs 
is crucially influenced by the district of reference and by the policy developed thereby but the 
choice of where to open the practice is typically taken once and for all and responds to criteria that 
are probably unrelated to the amount of incentives provided by each district. The largest majority of 
GPs took  this decision well before the start of incentive based programs and also for the younger 
physicians other considerations such as local market conditions are likely to be more important. 
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Altogether, these institutional features greatly reduce the risk of endogeneity of economic 
incentives, when measured at the level of the individual GP. 
A second limitation concerns the difficulty to assess the overall social and financial returns of the 
money invested for improving quality in primary care. Despite covering the general population and 
a wide set of conditions, the measure of benefits used in the paper is still narrow with respect to all 
potential improvements generated by incentive based programs of the kind considered here. They 
can stimulate activities that produce better outcomes of care, or financial savings, that fail to be 
captured by reductions in avoidable hospitalisations. As long as expected benefits pertain also to 
dimensions that go beyond a more appropriate use of hospital resources, to provide conclusive 
statements in terms of cost benefit analysis for these policy actions calls for more comprehensive 
studies and our work can be seen as first step towards this challenging direction.  
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Table 1: 27 medical DRGs at risk of inappropriateness in primary care   
014 INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE OR CEREBRAL INFARCTION 
019 CRANIAL & PERIPHERAL NERVE DISORDERS W/O CC 
025 SEIZURE & HEADACHE AGE >17 W/O CC 
065 DYSEQUILIBRIUM 
088 CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE PULMONARY DISEASE 
089 SIMPLE PNEUMONIA & PLEURISY AGE >17 W CC 
090 SIMPLE PNEUMONIA & PLEURISY AGE >17 W/O CC 
091 SIMPLE PNEUMONIA & PLEURISY AGE 0-17 
127 HEART FAILURE & SHOCK 
131 PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISORDERS W/O CC 
133 ATHEROSCLEROSIS W/O CC 
134 HYPERTENSION 
142 SYNCOPE & COLLAPSE W/O CC 
182 ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENT & MISC DIGEST DISORDERS AGE >17 W CC 
183 ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENT & MISC DIGEST DISORDERS AGE >17 W/O CC 
184 ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENT & MISC DIGEST DISORDERS AGE 0-17 
208 DISORDERS OF THE BILIARY TRACT W/O CC 
243 MEDICAL BACK PROBLEMS 
245 BONE DISEASES & SPECIFIC ARTHROPATHIES W/O CC 
256 OTHER MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM & CONNECTIVE TISSUE DIAGNOSES 
294 DIABETES AGE >35 
324 URINARY STONES W/O CC 
395 RED BLOOD CELL DISORDERS AGE >17 
426 DEPRESSIVE NEUROSES 
427 NEUROSES EXCEPT DEPRESSIVE 
429 ORGANIC DISTURBANCES & MENTAL RETARDATION 
467 OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING HEALTH STATUS 
 
Table 2: Ambulatory Care Sensitive Condition ICD-9-CM Codes   
Angina   411.1, 411.8, 413. Excludes cases with procedure codes [01-
86.99] 
Asthma  493 
Bacterial pneumonia  481, 482.2, 482.3, 482.9, 483, 485, 486. Excludes cases with 
secondary diagnosis of sickle cell [282.6]. 
Cellulites  681, 682, 683, 686. Excludes cases with any procedure codes 
except 860 where it is the only procedure 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease  491, 492, 494, 496, 466.0 
Congestive heart failure  428, 402.01, 402.11, 402.91, 518.4 
Dehydration - volume depletion  276.5 
Diabetes  250.1, 250.2, 250.3, 250.8, 250.9, 250.0, 251 
Gangrene  785.4 
Gastroenteritis  558.9 
Grand mal status and other epileptic convulsions  345, 780.3 
Hypertension  401.0, 401.9, 402.00, 402.10, 402.90. Excludes cases with 
procedures 36.01, 36.02, 36.05, 36.1, 37.5, 37.7. 
Hypoglycemia  251.2 
Hypokalemia  276.8 
Immunization-related and preventable conditions  032, 033, 037, 045, 055, 072, 320.0, 390, 391 
Kidney/urinary infection  590, 599.0, 599.9 
Pelvic inflammatory disease  614 (Excludes 68.3-68.8) 
Peptic ulcer  [531, 532, 533] 
Pulmonary tuberculosis and other tuberculosis 011, 012-018 
Pyelonephritis  590 
Ruptured appendix 540.0, 540.1 
Severe ear, nose, and throat infections  382, 462, 463, 464, 465, 472.1 
Skin grafts with cellulitis  DRG 263, DRG 264 
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Table 3: Cross tabulation of DRGs and ACSCs   
 
 
DRGs  
 
ACSCs 0 1  Total 
0 
2911926 
(99.16%) 
7634 
0.26% 
 
 
2919460 
1 
13006 
(0.44%) 
3918 
(0.13%) 
 
 
16924 
 
Total 2924832  11552   
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics. Patient and GP characteristics, year 2005 
Explanatory variable Coding Mean/ 
Proportion 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
      
Patient level (n=2936384)      
Patient gender male=1 49.7    
Patient age Continuous 46.4 12.8 18 74 
Charlson index Continuous 0.1 1.1 0 50 
Physician level (n=3229)      
GP gender male=1 72.1    
GP age Continuous 52.0 5.4 72 32 
Practice location urban (if yes=1) 95.5    
Single handed practice (if yes=1) 44.7    
Pay-for-performance Continuous (% annual income) 0,4 1.4 0.0 39.6 
Pay-for-participation Continuous (% annual income) 5.4 4.4 0.0 56.8 
Pay-for-compliance Continuous (% annual income) 0.1 0.4 0.0 7.6 
List size per GP Continuous 1071.0 510.4 1 2521 
List average age Continuous 50.0 5.9 14 77 
District (n=39)      
District total bed Continuous 544.7 768.6 18 4290 
Hospitalization rate Continuous (% population) 19.4 9 4.8 33.5 
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Table 5: Economic incentives. Local Health Authorities, amounts in Euro, year 2005 
  Pay-for-performance Pay-for-participation Pay-for-compliance 
                 
LHA GP % GP MIN MAX MEAN STD 
% 
GP MIN MAX MEAN STD % GP MIN MAX MEAN STD 
1 211 82% 0 4222 1977 1300 98% 0 49214 7755 6498 8% 0 3966 119 525 
2 306 2% 0 4662 69 545 99% 0 12273 2264 2151 34% 0 3769 130 321 
3 345 15% 0 3532 185 566 100% 0 21505 6781 2993 12% 0 8652 157 940 
4 516 0% 0 878 3 55 98% 0 30333 6248 5118 10% 0 2066 96 334 
5 639 83% 0 21780 628 1662 99% 0 16586 4331 3305 3% 0 5440 22 234 
6 97 46% 0 5319 805 1636 100% 80 17287 3907 3417 5% 0 3130 120 580 
7 297 0% 0 0 0 0 99% 0 26063 8038 4976 6% 0 176 6 28 
8 294 11% 0 2436 47 197 99% 0 10964 2626 1516 55% 0 3906 204 420 
9 148 0% 0 0 0 0 99% 0 30659 4289 4529 14% 0 1352 54 193 
10 150 0% 0 0 0 0 97% 0 10705 3095 2051 13% 0 1963 109 313 
11 226 0% 0 0 0 0 97% 0 11169 2364 1871 6% 0 1555 30 146 
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Figure 1. Economic incentives in % GP annual income. Districts, year 2005 
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Table 6.  GP and patient factors predicting an avoidable hospital admission, year 2005. 
 MODEL A – 27 DRGs MODEL B – ACSCs 
Three level Three level 
Explanatory variables Coefficient SE p > Coefficient SE p > 
FIXED EFFECTS 
      
Constant -7.084 (0.174) *** -7.219 (0.173) *** 
Patient level       
Patient gender  -0.108 (0.019) *** -0.399 (0.016) *** 
Patient age  0.049 (0.001) *** 0.062 (0.001) *** 
Charlson index   0.003 (0.000) ***   0.004 (0.000) *** 
Physician level       
GP gender  0.014 (0.024)   -0.002 (0.021)  
GP age -0.006 (0.002) *** -0.003 (0.002)  
List per GP  1.80E-05 (2.50E-05)  2.80E-05 (2.10E-05)  
List average age -0.011 (0.003) *** -0.017 (0.003) *** 
Single handed practice 0.039 (0.017) ** -0.002 (0.017)  
Practice location urban -0.232 (0.041) *** -0.197 (0.045) *** 
Pay-for-performance -0.022 (0.011) ** -0.003 (0.010)  
Pay-for-participation 0.004 (0.003)  0.000 (0.003)  
Pay-for-compliance -0.039 (0.024) * -0.014 (0.020)  
District area level       
Hospitalization rate 0.003 (0.001)  0.004 (0.004)  
District total beds  -2.72E-06 (9.10E-06)  -1.17E-06 (4.20E-05)  
       
RANDOM EFFECTS       
Level 2 - σ 2 (u0jk) 0.020 (0.007) *** 0.019 (0.005) *** 
Level 3 - σ 2 (v0k) 0.029 (0.009) *** 0.037 (0.009) *** 
    
   
ρ GP 0.006   0.006   
ρ districts 0.009   0.011   
 
      
Deviance [-2ln(L)] 23960851 23960418 
*** p-value ≤ 0.01 **  p-value ≤ 0.05  * p-value ≤ 0.10 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Diabetes. Patient and GP characteristics, year 2005 
Explanatory variable Coding Mean/ 
Proportion 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
      
Patient level (n=164574)           
Patient gender male=1 50.3       
Patient age continuos 67.9 12.833 35 107 
No insulin dependence (if yes=1) 15.6       
Physician level (n=2938)           
GP gender male=1 74.2       
GP age continuos 50.8 5.539 35 71 
Practice type single-handed  31.4       
Practice location urban (if yes=1) 94.2       
Postgraduate qualification (if yes=1) 5.1       
Pay-for-participation continuos (% annual income) 0.2 0.718 -  0.006 8.841 
Diabetic list size per GP continuos 56.8 20.354 4 129 
List average age continuos 50.8 5.533 35 71 
District (n=38)           
Hospital beds in endocrinology continuos 15.7 9.888 2 28 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Pay-for-participation incentives for diabetes in % GP annual income. Districts, year 2005 
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Table 8.  Diabetes: GP and patient factors predicting an avoidable hospital admission, year 2005. 
 
 
RANDOM  EFFECTS 
  
Level 2 - σ 2 (u0jk) 1.27E-20  
Level 3 - σ 2 (v0k) 0.118  
   
 
ρ GP 3.73E-21  
ρ districts 0.035  
 
 
 
 
Deviance [-2ln(L)] 1356843 
 
 
**** p-value ≤ 0.01 **  p-value ≤ 0.05  * p-value ≤ 0.10 
 
 
 MODEL A – DIABETES 
Three level 
Explanatory variables Coefficient SE p > 
FIXED EFFECTS 
   
Constant -6.473 1.065 *** 
Patient level    
Patient gender  0.017 0.003 *** 
Patient age  0.239 0.070 *** 
No insulin dependence -1.232 0.070 *** 
Physician level    
GP gender 0.005 0.006  
GP age -0.165 0.089 * 
Single handed practice 0.126 0.076 * 
Practice location urban -0.315 0.127 *** 
List size -6.00E-05 1.11E-04  
List average age 0.009 0.015  
Pay-for-participation -0.045 0.025 ** 
District area level    
Hospital beds in endocrinology 0.006 0.004  
